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ABSTRACT 
Fundamental rights play an important role in the demarcation of 
copyright enforcement. This is especially true when the right holder 
seeks an injunction against an intermediary. The ECJ has applied a 
fair balance test to resolve fundamental rights conflicts in these 
situations. This balancing test has been subject to widespread 
criticism. Critics argue that this test is inherently flawed and would 
promote legal uncertainty. This paper demonstrates that the ECJ has 
nevertheless gradually embraced a more structured method of 
review, based on the principle of proportionality. 
 
 
 INTRODUCTION 
Modern copyright law is characterised by a growing awareness of the tension 
between the protection of the right to intellectual property (IP)1 and other 
fundamental rights.2 This tension manifests itself in all areas relating to 
copyright, including the interpretation of the exclusive right of the copyright 
holder to communicate the work to the public,3 the scope of copyright 
exceptions and limitations4 and copyright enforcement.5 
 
The increasing role of fundamental rights in copyright law is a direct 
consequence of the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon. Based on this 
Treaty, the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (CFR) became legally binding.6 
Article 6(1) of the Treaty on the European Union (TEU)7 states that the Charter 
has the same legal value as the TEU and the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
                                                                    
 
 
* Peter Teunissen is a PhD candidate at Radboud University Nijmegen. 
1 Intellectual property rights are an aspect of the right to property. They are protected under Article 
17(2) of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. 
2 O. Fischman Afori, ‘Proportionality – A New Mega Standard in European Copyright Law’ (2014) 48 
IIC 890. 
3 ECJ 8 September 2016, C-160/15, GS Media. 
4 See ECJ 1 December 2011, C-145/10, Eva-Maria Painer; ECJ 3 September 2014, C-201/13, 
Deckmyn; ECJ 21 October 2010, C-467/08, Padawan. 
5 See e.g. ECJ 29 January 2008, C-275/06, Promusicae; ECJ 24 November 2011, C-70/11, Scarlet 
Extended; ECJ 16 February 2012, C-360/10, Netlog; ECJ 27 March 2014, C-314/12, UPC Telekabel; 
ECJ 15 September 2016, C-484/14, McFadden. 
6 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, [2012] OJ C-326/02, hereinafter: CFR. 
7 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the European Union, [2010] OJ C-83/01, hereinafter: TEU. 
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European Union (TFEU),8 which means it belongs to the primary legislation 
of European Union law. Therefore, the Charter has primacy over secondary 
legislation, such as directives and regulations. 
 
In the field of copyright enforcement, the influence of fundamental rights has 
grown rapidly. This is in particular the case in situations where the right holder 
seeks an injunction against an intermediary. The legal basis of an injunction 
rests on Article 8(3) Copyright Directive, which contains a provision almost 
identical to Article 11(3) of the Enforcement Directive.9 On the basis of this 
provision, injunctions may be granted to intermediaries regardless of their 
liability. 
 
A number of fundamental rights play a part when an injunction against an 
intermediary is in question. For instance, a website blocking order may 
infringe the freedom to receive information of its users (Article 11 CFR), but 
also potentially encroaches on the freedom of the intermediary to conduct a 
business (Article 16 CFR).10 In this situation and other situations, collisions 
between the right to intellectual property, which is an aspect of the right to 
property (Article 17(2) CFR), and other fundamental rights are inevitable. The 
Court of Justice of the European Union (ECJ) has applied a fair balance test to 
resolve fundamental rights conflicts that rise when a right holder asks for an 
injunction against an intermediary.11 
 
The fair balance test as employed by the ECJ, but also as a general concept, 
has received a fair amount of criticism. An important part of this criticism is 
aimed at the presumed vagueness of the notion. In addition, the application of 
the principle of proportionality, laid down in Article 52(1) CFR, remains 
inconsistent. Some authors have pointed out that this principle plays a vital 
role in the reconciliation of the right to intellectual property with other 
fundamental rights.12 The McFadden judgment forms an example of a more 
detailed application of this principle.13 
 
 INJUNCTIONS AGAINST INTERMEDIARIES 
The employment of remedies against intermediaries has grown swiftly in the 
past years.14 The roots of this growth lie in the difficulties copyright holders 
experience when going after infringers directly. On the one hand, this method 
has proven to be ineffective and cost-intensive. On the other hand, it has 
harmful effects on the public image of the copyright holder. Right holders 
often find themselves confronted with the impossibility of holding an 
                                                                    
 
 
8 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union [2012] OJ L-326/47-
326/390, hereinafter: TFEU. 
9 Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of May 22, 2001 On the 
Harmonisation of Certain Aspects of Copyright and Related Rights in the Information Society [2001] 
OJ L-167, hereinafter: Copyright Directive; Directive 2004/48/EC of the European Parliament and 
of the Council of April 29, 2004 On the Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights [2004] OJ L-
195, hereinafter: Enforcement Directive. 
10 Regarding the right to the freedom to conduct a business and the freedom of information, see ECJ 
27 March 2014, C-314/12, UPC Telekabel. 
11 See ECJ 29 January 2008, C-275/06, Promusicae. See also: P. Oliver & C. Stothers, ‘Intellectual 
property under the Charter: are the Court’s scales properly calibrated?’ (2017) 54 Common Market 
Law Review 565. 
12 See Fischman Afori, (n 2) 898-901; J. Christoffersen, ‘Human rights and balancing, the principle 
of proportionality’ in C. Geiger (ed), Research Handbook on Human Rights and Intellectual 
Property (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar 2015) 19-38. 
13 ECJ 15 September 2016, C-484/14, McFadden. 
14 C. Geiger & E. Izyumenko, ‘The Role of Human Rights in Copyright Enforcement Online: 
Elaborating a Legal Framework for Website Blocking’ (2016) 32 Am. U. Int’l L. Rev. 44. 
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intermediary liable for infringements committed by its users, as in most cases 
the intermediary is exempted from all forms of liability. 
 
The legal basis for this exemption can be found in the so-called “safe harbour” 
of the E-Commerce Directive, laid down in Articles 12, 13 and 14. These 
provisions specifically rule out liability of intermediaries that merely pass on 
or provide access to information, store data through caching or provide 
hosting services.15 The scope of the safe harbour encompasses all forms of 
wrongdoing, including, but not limited to, infringement of intellectual 
property rights.16 
 
The applicability of the safe harbour exceptions does not necessarily entail that 
copyright holders are deprived of all prospects of protecting their interests. 
Under Article 8(3) of the Copyright Directive, Member States are obliged to 
ensure that right holders can apply for an injunction against intermediaries 
when their services are used by a third party in order to infringe a copyright or 
related right.17 This provision is based on the general provision for IP 
injunctions against intermediaries, laid down in Article 11 of the Enforcement 
Directive.18 In L’Oréal v eBay, the ECJ clarified that an injunction can be 
sought in order to bring infringements to an end, but also to prevent those 
infringements from occurring in the future.19 
 
Article 8(3) of the Copyright Directive has formed the basis of a wide range of 
injunctions. Examples from ECJ case law include a duty to provide personal 
data,20 mandatory blockage of a website,21 an obligation to filter electronic 
communications22 and an imposition of a duty to secure a wireless network 
through password restriction.23 Most Member States have incorporated a 
practically unaltered version of the provision in their domestic laws.24 
2.1. National divergences and their limits 
The specific conditions and modalities relating to the aforementioned 
injunctions are left to national law.25 This creates divergences in interpretation 
between Member States, as can be seen in domestic case law. A textbook 
example of such deviations is apparent from the case law concerning website 
blocking orders. For various reasons, such as different interpretations of 
directive provisions, or the existence of additional requirements under 
national law, the outcome of rulings on the permissibility of this remedy varies 
between states.26 
 
However, despite these divergences, the European legislative framework does 
                                                                    
 
 
15 Articles 12 (“Mere conduit”), 13 (“Caching”) and 14 (“Hosting”) of the E-Commerce Directive. 
16 Also covered by the safe harbour are legal wrongs derived from private law, such as hate speech or 
incitement to violence. See C.A. Angelopoulos & S. Smet, ‘Notice-and-Fair-Balance: How to Reach a 
Compromise between Fundamental Rights in European Intermediary Liability’ (2016) 8 Journal of 
Media Law 268. 
17 Article 8(3) of the Copyright Directive. 
18 Article 11 of the Enforcement Directive. 
19 ECJ 12 July 2011, C-324/09, L’Oréal v eBay, para 131. See also ECJ 24 November 2011, C-70/11, 
Scarlet Extended, para 31; ECJ 16 February 2012, C-360/10, Netlog, para 29. 
20 See ECJ 29 January 2008, C-275/06, Promusicae; ECJ 19 April 2012, C-461/10, Bonnier Audio. 
21 See ECJ 27 March 2014, C-314/12, UPC Telekabel. 
22 See ECJ 24 November 2011, C-70/11, Scarlet Extended. 
23 See ECJ 15 September 2016, C-484/14, McFadden. 
24 P. Savola, ‘Proportionality of Website Blocking: Internet Connectivity Providers as Copyright 
Enforcers’ (2014) 5 JIPITEC 119. 
25 Recital 59 of the Copyright Directive; see also Recital 23 of the Enforcement Directive. 
26 See for a comprehensive overview Savola (n 24) 122-125. 
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indeed provide some general rules regarding remedies against intermediaries. 
As follows from L’Oréal v. eBay, the standards and principles laid down in EU 
legislation are relevant when the admissibility of an injunction is in question.27 
In this judgment, the ECJ has set out the minimum standards to which IP 
injunctions must adhere. Specifically, the conditions laid down in the 
Enforcement Directive must be met:  
 
(…) [T]he third sentence of Article 11 of Directive 2004/48 must be interpreted 
as requiring the Member States to ensure that the national courts with 
jurisdiction in relation to the protection of intellectual property rights are able 
to order the operator of an online marketplace to take measures which 
contribute, not only to bringing to an end infringements of those rights by 
users of that marketplace, but also to preventing further infringements of that 
kind. Those injunctions must be effective, proportionate, dissuasive and must 
not create barriers to legitimate trade.28 
 
The general requirements of effectiveness, proportionality and dissuasiveness, 
as well as the obligation to avoid barriers to legitimate trade, are derived from 
Article 3(2) of the Enforcement Directive.29 Furthermore, Article 15 of the E-
Commerce Directive excludes the imposition on exempted intermediaries of a 
general obligation to monitor information transmitted by those 
intermediaries. This prohibition must be read in conjunction with Article 3(2) 
of the Enforcement Directive.30 
2.2. Fair balance between IP and other fundamental rights 
In claims against intermediaries, several fundamental rights are at stake, as 
the example in the introduction already demonstrated. On the side of the 
copyright holder, the fundamental right to intellectual property as laid down 
in Article 17(2) of the Charter is relevant. This right can collide with other 
fundamental rights of other actors, such as the right of an intermediary to 
conduct a business, the right of the public to receive information as well as the 
rights to privacy and data protection of the public.31 In copyright enforcement, 
these rights collide inherently, as their underlying interests are often 
contradictory. For example, copyright holders may benefit from an injunction 
that compels an ISP to block a website containing infringing material from its 
users. However, such a measure is capable of restricting the freedom of these 
users to receive information. If the measure implies processing personal data 
(i.e. through filtering32), the right to data protection of the users may also be 
infringed. 
 
As has been explained before, the EU regulatory framework does not 
harmonise which measures can be subject to an injunction, nor does it provide 
the conditions and modalities under which such an injunction can be granted. 
This lack of guidance has moved the ECJ, as Griffiths expresses it, to put some 
flesh on the bones of European IP enforcement.33 The ECJ has shaped 
harmonised enforcement rules by requiring that, when the right to IP collides 
                                                                    
 
 
27 ECJ 12 July 2011, C-324/09, L’Oréal v eBay, para 137. 
28 ECJ 12 July 2011, C-324/09, L’Oréal v eBay, para 144. 
29 See E. Rosati, ‘Intermediary IP Injunctions in the EU and UK Experiences: When Less 
(Harmonization) is More?’ (2017) 3 GRUR Int. 206-215. The author mentions that the principle of 
effectiveness is to be read in conjunction with Recital 3 of the preamble of the Enforcement Directive. 
30 ECJ 12 July 2011, C-324/09, L’Oréal v eBay, para 139. 
31 See Article 16, 11, 7 and 8 CFR. 
32 As was the case in ECJ 24 November 2011, C-70/11, Scarlet Extended and ECJ 16 February 2012, 
C-360/10, Netlog. 
33 J. Griffiths, ‘The Balancing Methodology’ (CIPIL Annual Spring Conference 2017 – Intellectual 
Property and Human Rights, Cambridge, March 2017). 
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with other fundamental rights, a fair balance must be struck between the 
concurring rights.34 The roots of the fair balance requirement will be dealt with 
in the subsequent paragraphs. 
 
 FAIR BALANCE – HOW IT CAME INTO BEING 
3.1. Roots of the balancing concept  
The requirement that a fair balance must be struck between conflicting 
fundamental rights is not a stand-alone concept, but a variant of the principle 
of proportionality.35 This principle is an instrument that has its roots in 
German administrative law and is aimed at balancing conflicting interests.36 
Originally, it was used to challenge measures that were excessive or 
unnecessary to pursue a certain objective.37 The notion was developed into a 
positive legal concept in other fields of law and, eventually, also beyond 
Germany.38 As a result of this development, proportionality serves as a vital 
component of the constitutional model of many democracies.39 
 
The European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) does not explicitly 
mention the principle of proportionality. Nevertheless, the European Court of 
Human Rights (ECtHR) has employed the requirement of a fair balance, along 
with the other components of proportionality, as instruments for reviewing the 
admissibility of human rights restrictions.40 The ECtHR’s analysis typically 
comes with a broad margin of appreciation, which grants the domestic 
authorities a measure of discretion as to how they protect and limit 
fundamental rights.41 
 
It must be said that, while the principle of proportionality is clearly rooted in 
administrative law, balancing of rights can be found in various fields of law, 
including private law. For example, the doctrine of abuse of rights deals with 
the question whether a form of use or conduct is inappropriate. In this 
consideration, balancing of the pursued aim and the possible harm of this 
conduct is usually included.42 In the context of the prohibition of abuse of 
rights, which forms a general principle of EU law, the ECJ seems to have 
                                                                    
 
 
34  See the case law cited under note 5. 
35 A. Barak, Proportionality: Constitutional Rights and their Limitations (Cambridge: CUP 2012) 
340 and 343-344; Oliver & Stothers (n 12) 546; Christoffersen (n 12) 35, see implicitly ECJ 22 
January 2013, C-283/11, Sky Österreich, paras 50 et seq. 
36 See L. Hirschberg, Der Grundsatz der Verhältnismäßigkeit (Göttingen: Schwarz 1981); R. Alexy 
(trans. Julian Rivers), A Theory of Constitutional Rights (Oxford: OUP 2002), A. Stone-Sweet & J. 
Mathews, ‘Proportionality, Balancing and Global Constitutionalism’ (2008) 47 CJTL 75. 
37 P. Craig & G. De Búrca, EU Law. Text, Cases, and Materials (Oxford: OUP 2015) 551; J Schwarze, 
European Administrative Law (London: Sweet & Maxwell 2006) 685-686. 
38 Barak (n 35) 180-181; J. Kokott, ‘From Reception to Transplantation to Convergence of 
Constitutional Models in the Age of Globalization – With Particular Reference to the German Basic 
Law’, in C. Starck (ed.), Constitutionalism, Universalism and Democracy – A Comparative 
Analysis: The German Contributions to the Fifth World Congress of the International Association 
of Constitutional Law (Berlin: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft 1999) 71. 
39 V. Jackson, Constitutional Engagement in a Transnational Era (Oxford: OUP 2010) 60. 
40 See e.g. Sporrong v. Sweden, Appl. No. 7151/75, EHRR 35 (1982) para 69. See also Fischman Afori 
(n 2) 896-897. 
41 See e.g. Lawless v. Ireland, Appl. No. 332/57 (1961) para 90; Belgian Linguistic, Appl. No. 
1474/62, 1677/62, 1691/62, 1769/63, 1994/63 and 2126/64 (1968) para 10; Handyside, Appl. No. 
5493/72 (1976) para 48. Cf. J. Gerards, ‘Pluralism, Deference and the Margin of Appreciation 
Doctrine’, (2011) ELJ 80, 102; J. Christoffersen, Fair Balance: Proportionality, Subsidiarity and 
Primarity in the European Convention on Human Rights (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff 2009) 233. 
42 See A. Kjellgren, ‘On the Border of Abuse – The jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice on 
circumvention, fraud and other misuses of community law’, (2000) European Business Law Review 
179-180. 
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acknowledged the relationship between proportionality and abuse of rights.43 
Specifically, in Diamantis, it held that the principle of proportionality serves 
as a prerequisite for the application of national provisions of abuse of rights, 
when the right in question is derived from EU law.44 
 
Notwithstanding the above, this article will focus on the principle of 
proportionality, as it forms the foundation of the balancing test as employed 
by the ECJ. 
3.2. Components of proportionality review 
Proportionality review consists of three or four steps. The initial step is formed 
by the legitimacy of the objective that is pursued, also known as the legitimate 
aim.45 Traditionally, only a three-part test is used.46 The three steps can be 
summarised as follows: 
 
1. The principle of suitability means that the measure affecting the right 
must be suitable to achieve the pursued aim; 
2. The principle of necessity means there is no other equally suitable 
measure available that is less restrictive to the right; 
3. The principle of proportionality in the narrow sense (stricto sensu) 
means that the measure may not upset a fair balance between the 
conflicting rights and/or destroy the essence of the right that is 
restricted.47 
 
The principle of suitability focuses on the question whether the chosen 
measure is appropriate to pursue the legitimate objective.48 In ECJ case law, 
this requirement is often referred to as the principle of appropriateness.49 The 
notion presumes that a measure possesses a minimum degree of effectiveness, 
as an ineffective measure cannot benefit the pursued aim.50 
 
The principle of necessity is more complicated than that of suitability. First of 
all, the broadness of the principle differs depending on the legal system. The 
core of traditional necessity analysis is deploying the ‘‘least restrictive means 
test’’, ensuring that the measure at hand does not restrict the right more than 
is necessary to achieve the objective.51 This interpretation is also known as the 
principle of strict necessity. It must be noted that, although it forms an 
essential part of the traditional three-tier proportionality analysis, the 
principle of strict necessity is not beyond dispute. For instance, the ECtHR has 
explicitly rejected the least restrictive means test in James and Others v 
United Kingdom, stating that the availability of alternative solutions only 
                                                                    
 
 
43 ECJ 12 March 1996, C-441/93, Pafitis, para. 67-70; ECJ 12 May 1998, C-367/96; Kefalas, para. 20-
22; ECJ 23 March 2000, C-373/97, Diamantis, paras 33-34. See also A.S. Hartkamp, European law 
and national private law (Intersentia 2016) p 105-106 and 121-122. 
44 ECJ 23 March 2000, C-373/97, Diamantis, para 44. See I.V. Aronstein, ‘The principle of 
proportionality in legal relationships between private parties: its versatility and its bottlenecks’ in 
A.S. Hartkamp, C.H. Sieburgh & L.A.D. Keus (ed), The influence of EU law on national private law, 
(Wolters Kluwer 2014) p 251-269. 
45 W. Sauter, ‘Proportionality in EU Law: A Balancing Act?’ (2013) CYELS 448; Stone-Sweet & 
Mathews (n 37) 75. 
46 Christoffersen (n 41) 69-72; Stone-Sweet & Mathews (n 37) 76. 
47 Barak (n 35) 131-133, 243-338; Christoffersen (n 12) 19-20. 
48 Sauter (n 45). 
49 See Sauter (n 45) 9-10; ECJ 13 November 1990, C-331/48, Fedesa; cf. ECJ 27 March 2014, C-
314/12, UPC Telekabel, Opinion of AG Cruz Villalón; ECJ 22 January 2013, C-283/11, Sky Österreich 
para 51 and 52. 
50 Christoffersen (n 12) 28. 
51 Stone-Sweet & Mathews (n 36) 76. 
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“constitutes one factor, along with others, relevant for determining whether 
the means chosen could be regarded as reasonable and suited to achieving the 
legitimate aim being pursued”.52 This does not mean that the availability of 
less onerous alternatives is irrelevant, but it also does not impose a general 
obligation to employ the least restrictive measure.53 
 
The final step, proportionality stricto sensu, contains a balancing act. The term 
“balancing” has different meanings, depending on the legal context in issue. 
With regard to proportionality review, it can be explained as an analysis that 
places the purpose of the limiting law on the one side and the limited 
constitutional right on the other side, balancing the benefit gained by the 
purpose of the law with the harm caused by the right.54 The outcome should 
establish a proper relation between the benefit that is gained by and the harm 
caused to the fundamental right.55 The core of the fair balance requirement 
thus lies in finding a proper relationship through balancing, without 
destroying the essence of the right. 
 
Although the principle of proportionality can be divided into different steps 
that can be used to delimit fundamental rights, these steps are often 
communicating vessels. For example, the consideration that a measure can 
only be deemed suitable by a small margin could have an effect on the review 
of the necessity standard as well as the assessment of proportionality stricto 
sensu. It can be assumed that such a measure will only pass the necessity test 
when its ineffectiveness is “compensated” by a pressing need, for instance 
because there are no other alternatives. In the same way, the effectiveness and 
restrictiveness of the measure, which are elements of the principles of 
suitability and necessity, are of influence of the final weighing of interests. 
3.3. Adoption of the balancing concept in copyright law  
The earliest example of the employment of a balancing test in EU copyright 
case law originates from Metronome Music, a judgment that pre-dates the 
CFR. In this case, the ECJ held that the freedom to pursue a trade and the right 
to property form “general principles of Community law”, which need to be 
viewed in relation to their social function.56  
 
With the entry into force of the 2001 Copyright Directive, the notion that rights 
should be weighed against each other became an integral part of copyright law. 
Recital 31 of the Directive formulates this explicitly, stating that: 
 
“A fair balance of rights and interests between the different categories of right 
holders, as well as between the different categories of right holders and users 
of protected subject-matter must be safeguarded”.57  
3.4. The principle of proportionality and the EU Charter of Fundamental 
Rights 
The principle of proportionality forms a general principle of EU law, which 
                                                                    
 
 
52 Christoffersen (n 12) 21-25. See also James and Others v. United Kingdom [PL] (21 February 1986, 
Series A. no. 98-B) para 51; Hatton and Others v. United Kingdom [GC] (8 July 2003, ECHR 2003-
VIII) para 123. 
53 Christoffersen (n 12) 22. 
54 Barak (n 35) 343. 
55 Barak (n 35) 131. 
56 ECJ 28 April 1998, C-200/96, Metronome Music, para 21. 
57 Recital 31 of the Copyright Directive. 
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means it has constitutional status.58 As a result, it is part of primary EU law, 
ranking equal to the treaties.59 In written form, the principle of proportionality 
has been anchored in various EU legislative instruments.60 An elaborate 
wording of the principle is enshrined in Article 52(1) CFR, which has been an 
instrument of EU law since its ratification in 2000.61 The provision, which 
deals with the scope of the rights guaranteed by the CFR, reads as follows: 
 
“Any limitation on the exercise of the rights and freedoms recognised by this 
Charter must be provided for by law and respect the essence of those rights 
and freedoms. Subject to the principle of proportionality, limitations may be 
made only if they are necessary and genuinely meet objectives of general 
interest recognised by the Union or the need to protect the rights and freedoms 
of others.” 
 
Since the entry into force of the Charter, the ECJ has increasingly used the 
concept of a fair balance when determining the scope of the exclusive rights,62 
interpreting and applying exceptions to copyright63 and evaluating the 
permissibility of remedial measures.64 However, unlike the ECtHR, the ECJ 
does not seem to rely on a general margin of appreciation doctrine.65  
 
 FAIR BALANCE AS DELIMITATION OF COPYRIGHT INJUNCTIONS 
As has been set out in the previous paragraphs, the ECJ has increasingly 
applied the principle of proportionality in EU copyright. This approach has 
proven to be particularly useful in lightly regulated areas, of which the field of 
copyright enforcement forms an example. This section will deal with the 
introduction of the condition of a fair balance by the ECJ as a tool to delineate 
copyright injunctions. 
4.1. Promusicae 
In the Promusicae case, the ECJ mentioned the balancing principle for the 
first time in relation to the demarcation of injunctions. The case revolved 
around the Spanish copyright holders’ association Promusicae and access 
provider Telefónica. The key question was whether the right holder could ask 
for an injunction that would compel Telefónica to disclose identities and 
physical addresses of clients who were exchanging files through the peer-to-
peer network KaZaA, infringing the rights of Promusicae. 
 
A number of fundamental rights were in play. On the side of the copyright 
holder, the relevant provisions were Articles 17(2) and 47 CFR, which contain 
the right to protection of intellectual property and the right to an effective 
remedy.66 Opposed to these rights were the right to privacy and data 
                                                                    
 
 
58 ECJ 15 October 2009, C-101/08, Audiolux, para 70. 
59 Hartkamp (n 43) p 95.  
60 For instance, article 3(2) of the 2004 Enforcement Directive explicitly states that, among other 
requirements, IP enforcement measures, procedures and remedies must be proportionate. 
61 Albeit not legally binding until the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon in 2009; see note 6. 
62 For example, see ECJ 8 September 2016, C-160/15, GS Media. 
63 See the case law cited under note 4. 
64 See the case law cited under note 5. 
65 For example, see ECJ 3 September 2008, C-402/05 P and 415/05 P, Kadi and Al Barakaat v. 
Council, para 41; cf. J. Griffiths, ‘Constitutionalising or harmonising? The Court of Justice, the right 
to property and European copyright law’ (2013) 38 ELR 70-71. 
66 ECJ 29 January 2008, C-275/06, Promusicae, para 61. See also ECJ 12 September 2006, C-
479/04, Laserdisken, para 65; ECJ 12 July 2005, C-154/04 and C-155/04 Alliance for Natural 
Health and Others, para 126; ECJ 13 March 2017, C-432/05, Unibet, para 37. 
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protection (Articles 7 and 8 CFR respectively).67 Various directives, under 
which the Data Protection Directive, the E-Privacy Directive, the E-Commerce 
Directive, the Copyright Directive and the Enforcement Directive, explicitly 
addressed these possible collisions.68 
 
The ECJ stated that, when implementing the directives mentioned above, the 
Member States must guarantee a fair balance between the right to intellectual 
property on the one hand and the right to privacy and data protection on the 
other hand. Also, when implementing the measures transposing the various 
directives, domestic authorities and courts will have to interpret national law 
in a manner consistent with these directives and with fundamental rights or 
other general principles, such as the principle of proportionality.69 With this 
approach, the ECJ seeks to find a balance between relevant fundamental 
rights, without giving priority to any of those rights.70 
4.2. Scarlet Extended and Netlog 
In the subsequent rulings LSG and Bonnier Audio, the ECJ confirmed the 
requirement of a fair balance, but refrained from providing guidelines that 
may help to determine whether this balance has been struck in a particular 
case.71 As a result, academic debate sparked concerning the substantiation of 
the notion.72  
 
In the twin judgments Scarlet Extended and Netlog, the ECJ engaged in a 
more detailed balancing exercise. Both cases revolved around the question 
whether an intermediary73 could be ordered to install a filtering system that 
would monitor all data relating to customers in order to prevent copyright 
infringements. The right holders’ fundamental right to intellectual property 
therefore had to be balanced against the freedom to conduct a business of the 
provider and the right to freedom of information and data protection of the 
users of the connection.74 
 
Before the balancing took place, the ECJ stated that it followed from L’Oréal v 
eBay that the proposed filtering system must observe the limitations arising 
from the Copyright Directive and the Enforcement Directive and from the 
                                                                    
 
 
67 ECJ 29 January 2008, C-275/06, Promusicae, para 63-64. 
68 Directive 95/46 (Data protection Directive), Directive 2000/31 (E-Commerce Directive), Directive 
2001/29 (Copyright Directive) and directive 2004/48 (Enforcement Directive). See e.g. Oliver & 
Stothers (n 11) 554. 
69 ECJ 29 January 2008, C-275/06, Promusicae, para 68; cf. ECJ 6 November 2003, C-101/01, 
Lindqvist, para 87; ECJ 26 June 2007, C-305/05, Ordre des barreaux francophones et 
germanophone and Others, para 28. 
70 R.D. Chavannes, ‘Belangenafweging in het informatierecht: het arrest Scarlet/SABAM en de 
botsing tussen auteursrecht en ondernemingsvrijheid, uitingsvrijheid en privacy’ in M. Geus et al., 
25 jaar Mediaforum. Een vooruitblik door de achteruitkijkspiegel (Otto Cramwinckel 2013) 195. 
71 ECJ 19 February 2009, C-557/07, LSG-Gesellschaft zur Wahrnehmung von 
Leistungsschutzrechten, para 28-29; ECJ 19 April 2012, C-461/10, Bonnier Audio, para 56. 
72 For example, see C.J. Angelopoulos, ‘Sketching the Outline of a Ghost: The Fair Balance between 
Copyright and Fundamental Rights in Intermediary Third Party Liability’ (2015) 17(6) Journal of 
Policy, Regulation and Strategy for Telecommunications, Information and Media 72-96; Griffiths 
(n 65) 70; C. Geiger & E. Izyumenko, ‘Copyright on the Human Right’s Trial: Redefining the 
Boundaries of Exclusivity Through Freedom of Expression’ (2014) 45 IIC 316-342;; T. Mylly, ‘The 
constitutionalization of the European legal order: Impact of human rights on intellectual property in 
the EU’ in Christophe Geiger (ed), Research Handbook on Human Rights and Intellectual Property 
(Edward Elgar 2015) 103-131. 
73 The case of Scarlet Extended concerned an internet service provider, while in Netlog it regarded a 
hosting provider. 
74 ECJ 24 November 2011, C-70/11, Scarlet Extended, paras 42 and 50; ECJ 16 February 2012, C-
360/10, Netlog, paras 40 and 48. 
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sources of law to which those directives refer.75 Subsequently, the ECJ ruled 
that the presented measure would constitute a general monitoring obligation, 
which would violate Article 15(1) of the E-Commerce Directive.76 
 
The analysis could have ended there, as the general monitoring limitation 
clearly prohibits the injunction, leaving no room for a weighing-up of interests. 
Nevertheless, the ECJ continued to perform the balancing exercise, perhaps to 
provide guidance for the interpretation of subsequent cases. After all, Scarlet 
Extended and Netlog both concerned rather extreme measures where less 
intrusive alternatives were imaginable.77 
 
Subsequently, the ECJ held that the injunction in question “would result in a 
serious infringement of the freedom of the ISP concerned to conduct its 
business since it would require that ISP to install a complicated, costly, 
permanent computer system at its own expense.”78 Such an obligation would 
be contrary to the conditions laid down in Article 3(1) of the Enforcement 
Directive, which states that measures should not be unnecessarily complicated 
or costly. The ECJ argued that in those circumstances, the proposed injunction 
would not satisfy the requirement of a fair balance between the opposing 
fundamental rights.79 
4.3. Legal uncertainty 
The aforementioned judgments have been met with disapproval in academic 
literature. Authors argued that the balancing test, owing to to its lack of 
substantiation by the ECJ, promotes legal uncertainty.80 It has been frequently 
stated that the ECJ’s interpretation of the requirement of a fair balance offers 
little assistance as a guiding principle for delineating enforcement measures.81 
This leads to courts, depending on the circumstances of the case, attempting 
to determine which fundamental right carries most weight and rule 
accordingly.82 Indeed, the ECJ seems to have offered little guidance as to the 
exact conditions that must be taken into account when balancing fundamental 
rights. If such guidance is not provided, the notion of a fair balance remains a 
“vague maxim.”83 Legal uncertainty continues to exist, except maybe for 
intermediaries that find themselves in situations identical to the rulings in 
which the ECJ already prescribed the outcome of the required balancing.84 
 
It is hard to disagree with this critique, as the balancing in Scarlet and Netlog 
is indeed not very elaborate. On the other hand, it should also be clear that it 
cannot be expected of the ECJ to provide a structured test on the occasion of a 
few specific cases.85 As Oliver and Stothers correctly state, “case law is a blunt 
instrument for deciding such complicated multi-faceted issues”. In addition, 
the ECJ could risk being accused of entering areas that should be left to the 
                                                                    
 
 
75 ECJ 12 July 2011, C-324/09, L’Oréal/eBay, para 138. 
76 ECJ 24 November 2011, C-70/11, Scarlet Extended, para 40; ECJ 16 February 2012, C-360/10, 
Netlog, para 38. 
77 See Savola (n 24) 120. 
78 ECJ 24 November 2011, C-70/11, Scarlet Extended, para 48. 
79 ECJ 24 November 2011, C-70/11, Scarlet Extended, para 49; ECJ 16 February 2012, C-360/10, 
Netlog, para 39. 
80 See for example A. Peukert, ‘The Fundamental Right to (intellectual) property’ in C. Geiger (ed), 
Human Rights and Intellectual Property (Edward Elgar 2015) 135; Angelopoulos & Smet (n 16). 
81 Griffiths (n 65) 69. 
82 Angelopoulos & Smet (n 16) 275. 
83 Griffiths (n 65) 65. 
84 This seems is highly theoretical, however, especially since an outcome prohibition is a rare 
instrument in itself. 
85 Oliver & Stothers (n 11) 547.  
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legislator. 
 
 SUBSTANTIATION OF THE PROPORTIONALITY TEST 
It can be inferred from its case law that the ECJ has been gradually developing 
the concept of a fair balance from an open-ended test into a structured 
limitation instrument, grounded on the principle of proportionality. This 
section will deal with the relevant judgments that have substantiated the 
required proportionality test. 
5.1. Sky Österreich 
In the aforementioned judgments, the ECJ refrained from a detailed analysis 
of the requirement of a fair balance. However, it has acknowledged that the 
principle of proportionality, in the form of a general principle of EU law, is of 
importance in such cases.86 The Sky Österreich judgment could provide an 
example of a more thorough examination of this principle. In this ruling, the 
ECJ engaged in an extensive proportionality review to find an appropriate 
balance between the fundamental rights in question.87 
 
An aspect of this case concerned the compatibility a provision of the 
Audiovisual Media Services Directive with the freedom to conduct a business 
of the holder of exclusive broadcasting rights. Article 14 of the Directive 
authorised Member States to take measures that prevent the right holder from 
broadcasting on an exclusive basis on events which are regarded by that 
Member State as being of major importance for society in such a way that 
would deprive a substantial proportion of the public of the possibility of 
following such events by live coverage or deferred coverage on free 
television.88 Subsequently, Article 15(1) of the Directive required Member 
States to ensure that other broadcasters would be allowed to make short news 
reports of events of high interest to the public. Finally, Article 15(6) of the 
Directive stated that, where the compensation is provided for the right holder, 
it shall not exceed the additional costs directly incurred in providing access to 
the signal.89 
 
In this case, Austrian commercial broadcaster Sky Österreich (Sky) acquired 
the exclusive rights to air Europa League football matches in Austrian territory 
from the Austrian communications regulator, KommAustria. For the purposes 
of producing short news reports, an agreement was reached between Sky and 
public broadcaster Österreichischer Rundfunk (ORF), allowing the latter to 
broadcast summarised reports of these matches. 
 
At the request of ORF, KommAustria decided that Sky was required to grant 
ORF the right to produce short news reports. However, Sky was not entitled to 
demand remuneration greater than the additional costs directly incurred in 
providing access to the satellite signal, which were practically non-existent. 
Simultaneously, it determined the conditions under which ORF could exercise 
that right. Both parties appealed against this decision before the Federal 
Communications Senate (Bundeskommunikationssenat, the Senate), 
Austria's highest broadcasting authority. 
 
                                                                    
 
 
86 See ECJ 29 January 2008, C-275/06, Promusicae; ECJ 24 November 2011, C-70/11, Scarlet 
Extended; ECJ 16 February 2012, C-360/10, Netlog. 
87 ECJ 22 January 2013, C-283/11, Sky Österreich. 
88 Art. 14 Audiovisual Media Services Directive. 
89 ECJ 22 January 2013, C-283/11, Sky Österreich, para 32. 
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The Senate questioned whether a provision of a directive which prevents the 
authorities of a Member State from providing for compensation would be an 
interference consistent with the principle of proportionality as enshrined in 
Article 52(1) CFR. In those circumstances, it referred to the ECJ the question 
whether the aforementioned provisions were compatible with Articles 16 and 
17 CFR. 
 
With regard to Article 16 CFR, the ECJ held that the freedom to conduct a 
business is not absolute, but that it should be viewed in relation to its social 
function. As a result, the right may be subject to limitations by means of an 
intervention on the part of public authorities. This is reflected in the way the 
principle of proportionality, as laid down in Article 52(1) CFR, must be 
implemented.90 
 
The ECJ consequently engaged in a thorough review of the Article 52(1) CFR. 
As to the principle of proportionality, it recalled that, according to settled case 
law, the principle requires that “measures adopted by EU institutions do not 
exceed the limits of what is appropriate and necessary in order to attain the 
objectives legitimately pursued by the legislation in question”.91 When 
multiple appropriate measures are available, recourse must be taken to the 
least onerous, whereas the disadvantages caused by this measure must not be 
disproportionate to the aims pursued.92 The first part of this sentence deals 
with the principles of suitability and necessity, while the second part refers to 
the principle of proportionality stricto sensu. 
 
The ECJ’s assertion that, when several appropriate measures are at hand, the 
least onerous remedy must be chosen, is remarkable. This phrasing seems to 
suggest that, as opposed to the ECtHR, the ECJ deploys a strict necessity test. 
Regardless of the underlying objective, it is up for discussion whether a “least 
restrictive measure” can be determined indisputably. It would seem that such 
an examination inherently brings a certain room for manoeuvre for judicial 
authorities. 
 
In its examination of the proportionality in the narrow sense of the measure, 
the ECJ weighed the disadvantages resulting from the provision against the 
benefits of the pursued aim, concluding that a fair balance has been struck 
between the directive provisions and the freedom to conduct a business.93 
 
It must be said that the circumstances of the Sky Österreich judgment are 
different from the aforementioned cases, as it concerned a form of legality 
review of a directive provision and not a resolution of two concurring 
fundamental rights. Nevertheless, the method used by the ECJ can be used as 
a blueprint to resolve conflicts between fundamental rights that arise when 
copyright holders seek an injunction against intermediaries. 
5.2. UPC Telekabel 
Arguably, the UPC Telekabel judgment forms the first example of detailed 
proportionality review in a case about an injunction against an intermediary. 
The case concerned an Austrian ISP called UPC Telekabel. The right holders, 
                                                                    
 
 
90 ECJ 22 January 2013, C-283/11, Sky Österreich, para 45-47. 
91 ECJ 22 January 2013, C-283/11, Sky Österreich, para 50. 
92 ECJ 22 January 2013, C-283/11, Sky Österreich, para 50. See ECJ 8 July 2010, C-343/09 Afton 
Chemical, para 45, and ECJ 23 October 2012, C-581/10 and C-629/10, Nelson and Others, para 71; 
ECJ 12 March 2002, C‑27/00 and C‑122/00, Omega Air and Others, para 62; ECJ 12 January 2012, 
C-504/04, Agrarproduktion Staebelow, para 35. 
93 ECJ 22 January 2013, C-283/11, Sky Österreich, para 67. 
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film producers Constantin Film Verleih GmbH and Wega 
Filmproduktionsgesellschaft GmbH, demanded the blocking of access to the 
website kino.to, which provided a large amount of copyrighted material. 
 
The essential question was whether an injunction that constitutes an “outcome 
prohibition” would be allowed under EU law. Such an obligation would require 
the intermediary to take all necessary measures in order to prevent a certain 
outcome. In this case, UPC Telekabel would be prohibited from allowing 
customers to access a website placing a protected subject-matter online, 
without the agreement of the right holders. Moreover, the injunction would 
not specify the measures that the access provider must take. 
 
The ECJ repeated its considerations in the earlier case of Promusicae, stating 
that, when different fundamental rights are at stake, national authorities must 
strike a fair balance between the applicable rights.94 In this case, two balancing 
acts were required. First of all, it had to be established whether an outcome 
prohibition would be capable of achieving a fair balance between the copyright 
and/or related rights (Article 17(2) CFR) on the one hand, and the 
intermediary’s right to conduct a business (Article 16 CFR) on the other. 
Subsequently, a balancing of interests needed to take place between, again, the 
copyright and/or related rights and the right to freedom of information of the 
users (Article 11 CFR).95 These balancing tests will be described below. 
 
5.2.1. Right to IP – freedom to conduct a business 
With regard to the first balancing act, the ECJ ruled that an outcome 
prohibition does not violate the necessary fair balance between the right 
holders’ right to intellectual property and the ISP’s freedom to conduct a 
business: 
 
“An injunction such as that at issue in the main proceedings constrains its 
addressee in a manner which restricts the free use of the resources at his 
disposal because it obliges him to take measures which may represent a 
significant cost for him, have a considerable impact on the organisation of his 
activities or require difficult and complex technical solutions. 
 
However, such an injunction does not seem to infringe the very substance of 
the freedom of an internet service provider such as that at issue in the main 
proceedings to conduct a business.”96 
 
In addition, it can be inferred from these grounds that the substance of the 
fundamental right is instrumental in the examination of the fair balance. This 
“core rights approach” can also be found in the trade mark case Coty 
Germany.97 Apparently, the required balancing must also be exercised in 
accordance with Article 52(1) of the Charter. This provision explicitly states 
that: 
 
“any limitation on the exercise of the rights and freedoms recognised by this 
Charter must be provided for by law and respect the essence of those rights 
and freedoms.”  
 
Measures that affect the substance (or essence98) of this right do not meet the 
                                                                    
 
 
94 ECJ 27 March 2014, C-314/12, UPC Telekabel, para 46. 
95 ECJ 27 March 2014, C-314/12, UPC Telekabel, para 47. 
96 ECJ 27 March 2014, C-314/12, UPC Telekabel, paras 50-51. 
97 ECJ 16 July 2015, C-580/13, Coty Germany. 
98 See ECJ 15 September 2016, C-484/14, McFadden, where the Court spoke of the ‘essence’ rather 
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requirements of a fair balance. 
 
The necessity criterion also shines through in the considerations of the ECJ 
that the measure at hand respects the essence of the freedom to conduct a 
business, because it allows the ISP to choose the measures to be taken in order 
to achieve the result sought, and the possibility of exoneration when the 
obligation would lead to unbearable sacrifices.99 
 
5.2.2. Transferring the balancing exercise 
Interestingly, the ECJ did not simply proceed to the required second balancing 
method. Instead, it transferred this task to the intermediary: 
 
“None the less, when the addressee of an injunction such as that at issue in the 
main proceedings chooses the measures to be adopted in order to comply with 
that injunction, he must ensure compliance with the fundamental right of 
internet users to freedom of information.”100 
 
The burden of balancing fundamental rights now rests on the intermediary. 
Accordingly, the need to strike a fair balance is no longer solely the 
responsibility of national authorities, but also of the intermediary. This 
supervisory shift is atypical for fundamental rights’ protection, as traditionally 
the state is charged with protecting fundamental rights.101  
 
Some authors suggest that this outcome is merely a result of the unusual 
circumstances of the UPC Telekabel case, specifically because of the peculiar 
nature of “outcome prohibitions”, and should not be read as a general 
imposition of fundamental rights duties on intermediaries.102 A counter-
argument can be made by pointing to Recital 59 of the Copyright Directive, 
which states that intermediaries are best placed to bring infringing activities 
to an end. Following this line of thinking, the intermediary could be the 
designated party to decide which measures should be taken.103 
 
It has been contended that shifting the balancing exercise to intermediaries is 
desirable. Though intermediaries might be best placed to bring infringements 
to an end, they certainly are not best placed to balance fundamental rights.104 
Angelopoulos argues that judges are much more familiar with the substance 
of the different fundamental rights and are therefore best equipped to perform 
the complicated balancing exercise. Moreover, as the author puts it, “internet 
service providers have no real way of knowing what is and what is not 
“reasonable” in the eyes of the law.”105 This means that the outcome of the 
weighing exercise would become even more unforeseeable, which would lead 
to even more legal uncertainty.106 
                                                                    
 
 
than the ‘substance’ of the right, while directly referring to UPC Telekabel. 
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In my opinion, this argument is not fully convincing. While it may be true that 
judges are more familiar with constitutional analysis, it could also be argued 
that intermediaries are in a better position to evaluate what possible measures 
can be taken and to understand and predict the effect of said measures. In 
addition, the ECJ has developed clear standards to which the intermediary 
must adhere in this assessment. On the one hand, the ISP must take all 
reasonable measures to prevent users from illegally accessing the copyrighted 
works. On the other hand, he must ensure that these measures do not 
unnecessarily deprive internet users of their rights.107 The next section will 
deal with the substantiation of these duties. 
 
Furthermore, the ECJ has provided an additional safeguard with regard to the 
protection of the freedom of information. It ruled that national judges must be 
able to verify if the measures chosen by the intermediary are capable of striking 
the required balance. Therefore, national procedural rules must provide a 
possibility for internet users to assert their rights before the court once the 
implementing measures taken by the internet service provider are known.108 
This creates the opportunity for users to invoke their fundamental rights and 
base their claim on these rights.109 
 
5.2.3. Right to IP – freedom of information 
Even though the ECJ refused to perform the second balancing exercise itself, 
it did provide the conditions under which this review must take place. The ECJ 
interpreted the requirement of a fair balance in the context of Article 52(1) 
Charter, which includes the principle of proportionality.110 
 
Legitimate aim 
The ECJ held that the measures adopted by the ISP must be strictly targeted, 
in the sense that they must serve to bring an end to a third party’s infringement 
of copyright or of a related right but without thereby affecting internet users 
who are using the provider’s services in order to lawfully access information. 
Failing that, the provider’s interference in the freedom of information of those 
users would be unjustified in the light of the objective pursued.111 From this 
wording, it follows that the measure must be aimed at blocking content that 
has been made available illegally in order to be deemed legitimate. 
 
Suitability 
The suitability assessment can be deduced from the ECJ’s consideration that 
measures taken by the addressee must be sufficiently effective to ensure 
genuine protection of the fundamental right at issue’.112 After all, suitability 
focuses on the relationship between means and ends.113 This requires a 
minimum degree of effectiveness in order to secure that the protected interest 
is not outweighed by its counter-weighing interests.114 
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110 ECJ 27 March 2014, C-314/12, UPC Telekabel, para 63. 
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The ECJ stated that the proposed measures should, at minimum,  
 
“have the effect of preventing unauthorised access to the protected subject-
matter or, at least, of making it difficult to achieve and of seriously 
discouraging internet users who are using the services of the addressee of that 
injunction from accessing the subject-matter made available to them in breach 
of that fundamental right.”115 
 
The considerations regarding the required effectiveness of blocking measures 
have led to discussion. Synodinou has argued that two of the most important 
variants, domain name server blocking (DNS-blocking)116 and IP address 
blocking117, are both likely to fail the effectiveness test, as these measures are 
said to have the disadvantage of being easy to circumvent and to carry high 
risks of ‘over-blocking’ (blocking of legal content).118 Methods that could prove 
to be effective, such as deep packet inspection (DPI)119, could in their turn fall 
within reach of Article 15 of the E-Commerce Directive, which prohibits 
obligations of general monitoring. 
 
On the other hand, it cannot be expected that the above-mentioned blocking 
measures are capable of leading to a complete cessation of infringements, 
which has also made explicit by the ECJ.120 This does not preclude the denial 
of injunctive relief, which could be the case when there are more fitting 
solutions or if the measure would lead to an imbalance between means and 
ends. However, as far as the standard of effectiveness goes, the threshold 
should not be set unnecessarily high.121 
 
Furthermore, it should be pointed out that the possibility of circumvention 
and effectiveness are not as directly correlated as is suggested. In his opinion 
on UPC Telekabel, Advocate General Cruz Villalón rightly stated that, while it 
may be true that some consumers will take advantage of the possibility to 
circumvent, it is also safe to assume that some users, after being notified of the 
illegal nature of the website, will not continue to search for alternative sources. 
In the opinion of the Advocate General, it would, therefore, be inadmissible to 
assume that every user is willing to commit (further) infringements when the 
opportunity is given.122 It would be even more incorrect to consider the 
possibility of circumvention a deciding factor the assessment of the 
effectiveness standard. In the British case Cartier, Arnold J rightly held that 
allowing such a defence would “not only undermine intellectual property 
rights, it would also be inimical to the rule of law.”123 
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Necessity 
The considerations on the necessity test remained brief. The ECJ held that, in 
order to comply with Article 52(1) CFR, measures must not unnecessarily 
deprive internet users of the possibility of lawfully accessing the information 
available.124 
 
It is not entirely clear whether this phrasing suggests that no strict necessity 
test is required. It seems that, as long as there is no unnecessary deprivation 
of lawful access, the measure passes the necessity test. In this case, it has to be 
examined whether the public can still have access to the information available, 
which also infers that the essence of the right must be left intact. A similar 
interpretation of necessity is also found in ECtHR case law.125 
 
Proportionality stricto sensu 
The ECJ does not proceed to a detailed assessment of proportionality stricto 
sensu.126 Instead, it held that a fair balance is struck, in accordance with Article 
52(1) CFR, when the requirements it set out before have been fulfilled.127 This 
clarifies that full proportionality analysis is required when an injunction is 
capable of restricting multiple fundamental rights. 
 
In the end, the weighing of interests remains short on specifics.128 Such an 
approach was to be expected though, as the case concerned an outcome 
prohibition, an injunction that is non-specific to begin with.129 
5.3. McFadden 
In McFadden, the ECJ ruled on the admissibility of three specific measures 
against Tobias McFadden, an operator of an open wireless network (hereafter: 
open WiFi). McFadden ran a business selling and leasing lighting and sound 
systems and operates an open (not password-restricted) and free-of-charge 
wireless local area network, on which customers could login without having to 
reveal their identity. After an anonymous person used the network to illegally 
download protected works, McFadden received formal notice from right 
holder Sony Music, informing him of the copyright infringement. In an 
unusual turn of events, McFadden took the right holder to court and asked for 
a negative declaratory action (negatieve Feststellungsklage). The right holder 
reacted with a counterclaim, asking for damages, an injunction against the 
infringement of its rights and reimbursement of the costs of formal notice, as 
well as court costs. 
 
The German court dismissed McFadden’s claims, upholding the counterclaims 
of Sony Music. McFadden appealed the judgment, claiming that he could not 
be held liable for the alleged infringement as he was exempted from liability 
under the provisions of the German law transposing the mere conduit-
exemption of Article 12(1) of the E-Commerce Directive. In the appeal 
proceedings, Sony Music stated that McFadden should nevertheless be held 
liable in accordance with the case law on indirect liability (Störerhaftung) of 
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WiFi operators.130 
 
The ECJ made quick work of this argument. It ruled that the mere conduit 
exemption also applied to the services provided by McFadden.131 As a result, 
Sony could not ask for damages, as the applicability of the safe harbour implies 
that recourse against intermediaries is not permitted.132 
 
The focus of the case therefore was on the proposed remedies. As has already 
been explained in section 2, the applicability of the safe harbour does not 
preclude the right holder from seeking an injunction against an intermediary 
in order to prevent or end infringements.133 In the present case, the referring 
court already formulated three possible measures that could be taken against 
an operator of an open WiFi-network.134 
 
The measures at hand consisted of 1) monitoring all information passing 
through an internet connection, 2) terminating the internet connection or 3) 
password-protecting it. 
 
5.3.1. Monitoring information 
The ECJ firmly dismissed the first measure. It held that such an injunction 
containing a duty to monitor all information would be incompatible with 
Article 15 of the E-Commerce Directive, as it imposed a general and absolute 
obligation.135 As a consequence, there was no need for balancing. 
 
5.3.2. Termination of the internet connection 
As there were no absolute restrictions that outright forbade the remaining 
measures, the ECJ proceeded to the weighing of interests. Starting with the 
second measure, which contained an obligation to terminate the internet 
connection, the ECJ balanced the freedom to conduct a business of McFadden 
against the right to intellectual property of Sony Music: 
 
“As regards, second, the measure consisting in terminating the internet 
connection completely, it must be found that so doing would cause a serious 
infringement of the freedom to conduct a business of a person who pursues an 
economic activity, albeit of a secondary nature, consisting in providing 
internet access by categorically preventing that provider from pursuing the 
activity in practice in order to remedy a limited infringement of copyright 
without considering the adoption of measures less restrictive of that freedom. 
 
In those circumstances, such a measure cannot be regarded as complying with 
the requirements of ensuring a fair balance is struck between the fundamental 
rights which must be reconciled (see, to that effect, as regards an injunction, 
judgment of 24 November 2011, Scarlet Extended, C‑70/10, EU:C:2011:771, 
paragraph 49, and, by analogy, judgment of 16 July 2015, Coty Germany, 
C‑580/13, EU:C:2015:485, paragraphs 35 and 41).”136 
 
As has been set out before, the proportionality test requires that the essence of 
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the right remains intact. Remarkably, the ECJ seems to have grounded its 
decision on the reasoning that termination would be unacceptable when there 
are less intrusive measures left unconsidered. In these circumstances, the 
proposed measure did not comply with the requirements of ensuring a fair 
balance between fundamental rights.137 
 
5.3.3. Password and identification 
The ECJ proceeded to the evaluation of the third remedy, consisting of an 
obligation on the WiFi-operator to password-protect the WiFi connection. 
First of all, the ECJ signalled two possible fundamental rights conflicts, as the 
measure at hand was capable of restricting both the freedom to conduct a 
business of the provider supplying the service of access to a communication 
network and the right to freedom of information of the recipients of that 
service.138 
 
Similar to the UPC Telekabel judgment, the ECJ dealt with these conflicts one 
by one, starting with the possible restriction of the freedom to conduct a 
business. However, contrary to the aforementioned ruling, the ECJ did not 
shift the second balancing task to the intermediary, but instead chose to 
perform the task itself. This might indicate that the ECJ intended no general 
shift of proportionality assessment.139 
 
 Right to IP – freedom to conduct a business 
In line with earlier judgments, the ECJ assessed whether the essence of the 
right to conduct a business of the WiFi-provider is damaged. It held that this 
was not the case, as long as the measure is limited to marginally adjusting one 
of the technical options open to the provider in exercising its activity.140 Under 
these conditions, the ECJ ruled that a fair balance was struck between the right 
to IP and the right to conduct a business. 
 
 Right to IP – freedom of information 
The other elements of the principle of proportionality are discussed in light of 
the limitation of the freedom of information of the users of the connection. 
 
Legitimate aim 
As to the legitimate aim of the proposed measure, the ECJ repeated the criteria 
set out in UPC Telekabel, stating that the measure adopted must be strictly 
targeted, in the sense that it must serve to bring an end to a third party’s 
infringement of copyright or of a related right but without thereby affecting 
the possibility of internet users lawfully accessing information using the 
provider’s services. Failing that, the provider’s interference in the freedom of 
information of those users would be unjustified in the light of the objective 
pursued.141 This confirms that the requirements set out in UPC Telekabel, 
notwithstanding its unique characteristics, are applicable to different kinds of 
remedies against intermediaries.  
 
Next, the ECJ held that a password-lock does not conflict with the objective 
pursued by the measure, as such technical restrictions do not form a true 
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blockage of internet access. Therefore, an obligation to password-protect the 
connection does not affect the possibility of internet users to lawfully access 
information.142 
 
Suitability 
The next step is the assessment of the suitability requirement. As has been set 
out before, the effectiveness standard requires that the measure must be able 
to, at least, make it difficult for users to infringe copyright or seriously 
discourage them from doing so.143 The ECJ ruled that a password restriction 
meets this standard, provided that users of the connection are required to 
reveal their identity in order to obtain the required password and may not 
therefore act anonymously, a matter which it is for the referring court to 
ascertain.144 
 
This is a surprising outcome, as the referring court did not specify a need for 
identification. This prerequisite could nevertheless have far-reaching 
consequences, as most operators do not require actual proof of identity, or do 
not ask for identification at all.145 
 
Necessity 
Before the ECJ moved on to the necessity standard, it recalled that, according 
to the referring court, there were only three measures the operator could take 
in order to comply with an injunction.146 Departing from this assumption, the 
ECJ considered the following: 
 
“Since the two other measures have been rejected by the Court, to consider 
that a communication network access provider need not secure its internet 
connection would thus be to deprive the fundamental right to intellectual 
property of any protection, which would be contrary to the idea of a fair 
balance (see, by analogy, judgment of 16 July 2015, Coty Germany, C‑580/13, 
EU:C:2015:485, paragraphs 37 and 38). 
 
In those circumstances, a measure intended to secure an internet connection 
by means of a password must be considered to be necessary in order to ensure 
the effective protection of the fundamental right to protection of intellectual 
property.”147 
 
The brief assessment of the necessity standard can be explained by the 
assumption that password-restriction was the only remedy left imaginable. On 
this assumption, and provided that it passes the effectiveness test, the measure 
almost automatically fulfils the necessity criterion, as there are no other (be it 
equally suitable or less restrictive) measures available. The ECJ finds 
password-locking necessary in the most basic meaning of the word, as it is 
truly indispensable as a means of protection. 
 
Of course, it remains to be seen if the measures as referred to by the German 
court were indeed the only options in this case. If the ruling is interpreted as 
saying that password-locking is a last resort measure, pointing to other 
acceptable measures could form a defence for the intermediary.148 
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Proportionality stricto sensu 
In its previous considerations, the ECJ already established that the essence of 
the right to freedom of information have been left intact: 
 
“In the second place, a measure consisting in securing an internet connection 
does not appear to be such as to undermine the essence of the right to freedom 
of information of the recipients of an internet network access service, in so far 
as it is limited to requiring such recipients to request a password, it being clear 
furthermore that that connection constitutes only one of several means of 
accessing the internet.”149  
 
In addition, as the ECJ presumed password-locking to be the only suitable 
remedy left, refusing the right holder this remedy would be contrary to a fair 
balance.150 
 
Taking into account the aforementioned paragraphs, the ECJ concluded that, 
under the conditions set out in its judgment, a measure consisting in securing 
a connection must be considered to be capable of striking a fair balance 
between, first, the fundamental right to protection of intellectual property and, 
second, the right to freedom to conduct the business of a provider supplying 
the service of access to a communication network and the right to freedom of 
information of the recipients of that service.151 This fulfils the final 
requirement, i.e. proportionality in the narrow sense. 
 
The McFadden judgment has given some additional guidelines for performing 
the balancing exercise. It is of primary importance that fundamental rights are 
not restricted in such a manner that the essence of these rights is violated. If 
this is not the case, the benefits of the pursued aim are outweighed by the harm 
done to conflicting fundamental rights. When the essence of the right is left 
intact, depriving the right holder of a remedy would be contrary to a fair 
balance.152 The remedies at hand, however, must bring merit to the right 
holder, which should already follow from the assessment of suitability and 
necessity. In this sense, the assessment of fair balance between the rights is 
always connected to the other conditions stated by the principle of 
proportionality. 
 
The ruling also brings substantive consequences for the possibility of 
monetary claims against intermediaries, as well as allowing password-locking 
throughout the EU. Husovec is critical of the judgment, arguing that the ECJ’s 
acceptance of password-locking is “short-sighted, but understandable given 
the (referring – PT) court’s framing of the problem.”153 Furthermore, as has 
been pointed out before, the right to privacy and the right to data protection 
have been omitted from the balancing test. This balancing should have been 
part of the equation, as both rights can be affected as a consequence of the 
identification that is required by the measure. Lastly, it seems to follow from 
this case that the presumed shift of enforcement burdens does not apply to 
specific measures, which should bring some relief to intermediaries 
throughout the EU. 
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5.4. Methods of proportionality review 
It has been argued that the balancing method is inappropriate when weighing 
the right to property against other fundamental rights, because it rests on the 
assumption that all fundamental rights are equal. Peukert states that this 
assumption disregards that the right to property (in general and in the form of 
IP) is fundamentally different from other individual rights and freedoms.154 
He substantiates his position as follows. As opposed to individual freedoms, 
the right to property only guarantees the existence and enjoyment of lawfully 
acquired possessions, which means they should have a sufficient basis in 
national law. As a result, IP rights are the outcome of democratic decision-
making. Because of this structure, conflicts between the right to (intellectual) 
property and other freedoms should not be resolved using a balancing test.155 
 
Peukert argues that, instead, courts should determine whether IP rights 
interfere with fundamental freedoms or the other way around. For instance, 
creation and expansion of IP rights by the legislature encroaches on the public 
domain and would therefore have to be justified in light of other fundamental 
rights and freedoms. It is my understanding that the same applies to 
injunctions against intermediaries, as long as they are able of interfering with 
multiple fundamental rights and freedoms and do not have an explicit legal 
basis. After the creation of IP legislation, any control of use would constitute a 
deprivation of the right to property. For this reason, the limitation of existing 
IP rights must be justified in light of the right to property. This technique 
essentially entails a justification method, based on a hierarchy of legal norms, 
rather than a balancing of fundamental rights presuming they are equal. The 
justification method is grounded on full proportionality analysis, which is an 
established practice in constitutional courts.156 
 
Collins, on the other hand, argues that there should be a weighing on an equal 
footing when fundamental rights – the right to property included – collide in 
private spheres. The author argues that courts should employ a “double” 
proportionality test to assess whether the restrictions on both fundamental 
rights can be justified in the light of the principle of proportionality.157 
 
It seems to follow from UPC Telekabel and McFadden that the ECJ resolves 
fundamental rights conflicts by employing full proportionality analysis. In its 
analysis, the ECJ assesses whether limitations on the rights that oppose the 
right to IP can be justified in the light of the principle of proportionality. The 
balancing of rights is an important instrument of the ECJ’s analysis, but other 
elements of the proportionality are also applied. In this consideration, 
interests of all parties involved are taken into account. 
 
One must be careful not to infer from these cases that the opposing 
fundamental rights are somehow prioritised over the right to IP. There is no 
indication that the ECJ acknowledges a hierarchy when it comes to 
fundamental rights. On the contrary: it has repeatedly stated that the right to 
intellectual property and other fundamental rights have to be balanced against 
each other, which implies their equality.158 It seems more likely that the ECJ 
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is merely interpreting the relevant directives, which in this case provide the 
right holder a certain remedy, in accordance with the Charter. 
 
 FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS AS STRATEGIC INSTRUMENTS 
It has been argued that the ECJ has been strategically applying fundamental 
rights to further certain goals.159 For instance, Mylly points out that the ECJ 
has been selective when referring to fundamental rights. This occurs when the 
ECJ only refers to certain fundamental rights if their interpretation leads to 
the desired result. To promote this outcome, the ECJ may even ignore certain 
fundamental rights in its analysis. 160 
 
An example of this can be found in the McFadden judgment, where the ECJ 
ruled that an injunction obligating an operator of a free Wifi-network to 
password-protect the connection “may dissuade the users of that connection 
from infringing copyright or related rights, provided that those users are 
required to reveal their identity in order to obtain the required password and 
may not therefore act anonymously, a matter which is for the referring court 
to ascertain.”161 This wording indicates that mandatory identification of the 
users of the network is necessary. It seems obvious that in such cases, the right 
to privacy and data protection of the users (Article 7 and 8 CFR) should be 
taken into account.162 The ECJ nevertheless left these fundamental rights out 
of the equation entirely. It only referred to the right to conduct a business of 
the WiFi-operator and the right to freedom of information of the internet 
users, concluding that the essence of both rights has been left intact.163 On the 
basis of this weighing of interests, the ECJ ruled that the aforementioned 
measure is capable of striking a fair balance. However, it appears self-evident 
that there can be no such balance when some fundamental rights have been 
overlooked. 
 
In general, the ECJ seems to have essentially promoted the advancement of 
harmonisation of EU law.164 By referring to fundamental rights the ECJ seems 
to have regulated situations not previously thought to be covered by the 
acquis.165 The case law on injunctions against intermediaries is a striking 
example of the strategic potential fundamental rights possess. 
 
 CONCLUSION 
Within the area of IP enforcement, the ECJ seems to have gradually embraced 
the principle of proportionality as an instrument for the review of remedial 
measures. The early rulings Promusicae, Scarlet and Sabam are poignant 
examples of judgments that have promoted legal uncertainty as a result of the 
absence of concrete guidelines for the required balancing between 
fundamental rights.166 The ECJ’s examination in UPC Telekabel provides 
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more insight regarding the legal standards that surround remedial measures, 
though it remains short on specifics. The McFadden judgment provides 
helpful guidelines for the required proportionality review. The outcome of 
individual cases will remain indeterminate to a certain degree, as Oliver and 
Stothers strikingly illustrate by bringing up the disagreements between 
Advocates General and the ECJ in rulings concerning copyright injunctions.167 
 
On another note, the extensive use of fundamental rights to delimit 
enforcement measures has been criticised by various authors.168 This criticism 
is not likely to evaporate, as the ECJ seems to emphasise the importance of 
fundamental rights even more in McFadden.169 However, this can also be seen 
as a natural consequence of the entry into force of the Charter, as the 
acknowledgment of fundamental rights as primary EU law inevitably leads to 
‘cross-fertilisation of the private and public law spheres’.170 
 
The specific details of the proportionality test still largely depend on the rights 
in question, the measures at hand and the relevant circumstances. The 
balancing method is inherently case-related, which makes it difficult to 
identify generally applicable standards from ECJ case law. The EU legislature 
may be best placed to lay down a more structured framework that offers a 
solution to the various fundamental rights conflicts that may occur. Until then, 
the ECJ has provided useful conditions under which the admissibility of 
copyright injunctions can be assessed. 
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